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LEGISLATIVE NOTES:

THE FDA'S OVER-THE-COUNTER DRUG REVIEW:
EXPEDITIOUS ENFORCEMENT BY RULEMAKING

On May 11, 1972, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a final order 1 establishing procedures for review of all
over-the-counter (OTC) drugs. 2 The OTC drug review attempts to
evaluate the safety, effectiveness and labeling of OTC drugs pursuant to
the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 3 and the 1962 amendments4 to that act. It is an awesome undertaking. The FDA estimates that
between l 00,000 and 500,000 OTC drugs are currently on the market, 5 the
great majority of which have not undergone any premarket review by the
FDA. 6
The OTC drug review represents a significant departure from traditional drug regulation in two respects. First, the review involves
monographs-regulations for broad categories of OTC drugs-rather than
case-by-case adjudication for individual drugs. 7 Second, the FDA is relying heavily on non-FDA scientific experts to evaluate the drugs included
in the review, rather than depending primarily on its own staff.

1 37 Fed. Reg. 9, 473 (1972) (codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 330 (1977)). The proposed order
was published in January of 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972).
2 The amended Act does not distinguish between prescription and OTC drugs. It does,
however, define the conditions under which a drug can be marketed, 21 U .S.C. § 355(d)
(1970); for example, whether it can be marketed OTC or only by prescription. In addition, it
provides that a drug is misbranded when dispensed without a prescription if it is habitforming, if it is toxic or otheiwise potentially harmful, if its method of use is unsafe without
supervision by a licensed practitioner, or if the approved NOA limits its dispensation to
prescription sales. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(I) (1970). All other drugs are OTC drugs by implication and long-established understanding. FooD DRUG Cos. L. REP. (CCH) ,r 72,010.
The FDA is authorized under section 701(a) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 37 l(a} ( 1970), to
administratively determine whether a drug is a prescription or OTC drug. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 699 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
827 ( 1975) (upholding FDA regulations classifying vitamins A and D in excess of specified
dosages as prescription drugs). Pursuant to this authority, FDA regulations provide that:
a drug shall be permitted for OTC sale and use by the laity unless, because of its
toxicity or other potential for harmful effect or because of the method of collateral
measures necessary to its use, it may be safely sold and used only under the
supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs.
21 C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(4)(vi) (1977).
Pharmacists have long sought approval for a third intermediate drug category that can be
sold OTC under the supervision of a pharmacist, but this proposal has yet to receive serious
attention. Myers & Fink, Legal Considerations in Establishing Third and Fourth Classes,~[
Drug Products. 31 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 4 (1974); DRUG TOPICS 14 (1977).
3
52 Stat. 1040 (1938); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
• 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
5
37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972).
6
See notes 15-17 and accompanying text infra.
7 See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra. See also DiPrima. Some Partisan Musings
on the OTC Review and the Advertising TRRs, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 405, 406 (1977).
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This article attempts to show that the OTC drug review has distinct
advantages over traditional drug regulation. Part I outlines briefly the
traditional case-by-case approach to drug licensing and describes FDA
enforcement efforts prior to the OTC drug review. Part II sets forth the
new rulemaking approach and considers the use of advisory panels. Part
III examines several procedural questions associated with the review and
concludes that the use of monographs as regulatory standards will afford
the FDA an expeditious enforcement mechanism by resolving complex
scientific issues at the administrative rather than the judicial level. Judicial review should be available, however, to ensure the reasonableness of
the monographs, especially where a final monograph does not incorporate
panel recommendations.

I. NOA APPROACH

The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended, 8 requires that the
FDA create an administrative review mechanism to ensure the safety and
efficacy of any "new drug" before marketing. 9 The 1938 Act defined a
"new drug" as a drug which was "not generally recognized, among
experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the
safety of drµgs, as safe. " 10 The 1962 amendments expanded the definition
to encompass drugs not generally recognized as safe and effective
(GRAS&E).11 Manufacturers of "new drugs" are required to submit new
drug applications (ND As) to the FDA prior to marketing. 12 An application
must contain a list of ingredients, samples of the drug, an example of the
labeling, studies showing the drug to be safe and effective, and a descrip21 U .S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 505(a); 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). The need for
premarket review was demonstrated by the deaths of 107 people from a sulfa preparation in
which diethylene, a chemical related to antifreeze, was used as a solvent. The only tests
conducted by the company were for appearance, flavor and fragrance. H. TEFF & C.
MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 108 (1976). The then existing Food and
Drug Act of 1906, §§ I, 2, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), was exclusively a policing statute prohibiting
the sale of adulterated or misbranded food or drugs. The FDA instituted seizure actions after
it learned of the deaths, but seizure was legally possible only because the drug was labeled
an "elixir," which erroneously implied it contained alcohol. See M. MINTZ, BY PRESCRIPTION ONLY 48-49 (1%7).
10
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 20l(p)(I), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
11
21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(I) (1970), as amended by § 102(a)(I), 76 Stat. 780 (1962). The
Thalidomide tragedy in Europe precipitated a general Congressional awareness that the 1938
Act might no longer be adequate. Thalidomide was absent from United States markets
because of the stubbornness of a single FDA member rather than the provisions of the 1938
Act. See H. Teff & C. Munro,supra note 9, at 120-21. The amendments were primarily
aimed at the testing of new drugs. See Mintz, supra note 9, Ch. 12.
12
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). Since general recognition is the crucial focus of inquiry, it is
often not clear whether a drug is a "new drug." One relevant consideration is the marketing
history of the drug. Section 201(p)(2) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(p}(2) (1970), specifically treats any drug as a "new drug" unless it has been marketed for a material length of
time. One advantage of the OTC drug review is that a manufacturer will know whether a
particular drug falls within the "new drug" definition, thus requiring an approved NOA
before marketing. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra.
8

9
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tion of its method of manufacture. 13 A "new drug" may not be marketed
until the NDA is approved by the FDA. 14
Only an exceedingly small proportion of the OTC drugs on the market
go through the NOA process. 15 The vast majority are marketed on the
assumption that they are GRAS&E, which puts the burden on the FDA to
initiate regulatory action. 16 More importantly, both the 1938 Act and the
1962 amendments contained grandfather clauses exempting most OTC
drugs which had not gone through the NOA process from the statutory
definition of a "new drug." 17 Thus, a review of all OTC drugs was not
possible under the premarket review mechanism provided by the
amended 1938 Act.
The 1962 amendments required the FDA to evaluate all NDAs effective
prior to 1962 to ascertain the effectiveness of the drugs covered by those
applications, 18 and to withdraw approval if "substantial evidence" of a
drug's efficacy was lacking. 19 To speed implementation of the 1962
21 u.s.c. § 355(b) (1970).
Id., § 355(a). The 1938 Act allowed an NDA to become effective within 60 days of
submission unless the FDA refused approval, § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), but the 1962
amendments require FDA approval before a "new drug" can be marketed. 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(d) (1970). The FDA can bring enforcement actions in the federal district courts for
injunction, criminal prosecution, or in rem seizure and condemnation. 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334
(1970).
The NDA process is a laborious one for both the FDA and the pharmaceutical manufacturers. Approximately 100 NDAs were being submitted to the FDA annually in 1974. J.
MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 470
(1975). By 1963, the typical NDA had grown in length from six to approximately 1,000 pages,
and required nineteen to twenty-six months for processing. See Note, The Drug Amendments of /962, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1082, 1092 n.1 (1963). By 1969, each submitted NDA
contained about thirty volumes constituting a stack ten to twelve feet high with some NDAs
containing up to four hundred volumes of data. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 624 (1973).
15
Only 420 of the approximately 4000 NDAs reviewed by the NAS-NRC, see notes 20-22
and accompanying text infra, panels involved OTC drugs. 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972).
16
The Act does not state who determines whether a drug needs an NDA, and the
pharmaceutical industry contended that determinations by individual manufacturers would
be sufficient prior to marketing. Prior to 1973, the FDA attempted to block marketing of
drugs which it found not GRAS&E primarily by court action. However, in 1973, the
Supreme- Court held that the FDA could issue a declaratory order that a drug is a "new
drug," thus requiring manufacturers to challenge the declaratory order in court. Weinberger
v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973).
17
The 1938 Act exempted from the "new drug" definition any drug subject at any time to
the 1906 Act if at such time the labeling contained the same representations concerning use.
§ 201(p)(I), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). The 1962 amendments exempted certain drugs that were
commercially used or sold in the United States on the day preceding the enactment of the
1962 amendments. In order to be exempt, a drug had to be generally recognized as safe on
the day prior to the amendments, not covered by an effective NDA, and "intended solely for
use under conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in labeling with respect to
such drug(s) on that day."§ 107(c)(4). 76 Stat. 789 (1962). The FDA can always challenge
the grandfather status of a drug by asserting that the drug was not generally recognized as
safe before the amendments.
An anomaly exists between the grandfather clause of the 1962 amendments exempting
certain drugs having no NDA from the definition of a "new drug" and § 107(c)(3)(B), 76
Stat. 788 (1962), which provides drugs with NDAs a two year exemption from the efficacy
requirements. There is no perceptible reason for this difference.
18
21 U.S.C. § 355(e)(3) (1970). The retroactive effect of§ 355(e) was upheld in Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
1
" 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1970).
13
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amendments, the FDA contracted in 1966 with the National Academy of
Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) to review the pre-1962
NDAs. 20 A large number of drugs were found deficient, and after a review
of the NAS-NRC findings submitted in 1969, the FDA implemented the
results through its Drug Efficacy Study Implementation program. 21 Only
25 percent of the OTC drugs evaluated by the NAS-NRC study were
found to be "effective, " 22 and accordingly, the FDA decided to review all
OTC drugs. 23

II. OTC DRUG REVIEW

A. Rulemaking Approach

The FDA adopted a rulemaking approach to circumvent the deficiencies of the NOA process. Monographs covering various therapeutic categories of OTC drugs establish ''the conditions under which a category of
OTC drugs is generally recognized as safe and effective and not misbranded. " 24 Drugs conforming to an applicable monograph are not "new
drugs" and need not go through the NOA process. 25 Drugs not within the

20
MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 470. Each NDA was evaluated separately on a
continuum as follows: (I) effective; (2) probably effective; (3) possibly effective; (4) effective, but ... better or safer drugs are available; (5) ineffective as a fixed combination; (6)
ineffective. The evaluation of an NDA was typically a one page summary giving the
conclusion of the panel and perhaps a list of published articles used as references. The study
was characterized as "cryptic and conclusory without any statement of supporting facts."
U.S.V. Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Secretary of HEW, 466 F.2d 455, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
21
See MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14 at 470-518; Ames & McCracken, Framing
Regulatory Standards to Avoid Formal Adjudication: The FDA as a Case Study, 64 CAL. L.
REv. 14 (1976); Note, Drug Efficacy and the /962 Drug Amendements, 60 GEO. L.J. 185
(1971).
As already noted, the 1962 amendments require the FDA to prohibit the marketing of any
"new drugs" whose efficacy has not been demonstrated by "substantial evidence." 21
U.S.C. §§ 355(d) (disapproval of a submitted NDA) and 355(e) (withdrawal of an outstanding
NDA). However, the FDA is required to give the manufacturer notice and opportunity for
hearing before disapproval or withdrawal of the NDA. Id. In order to expedite the withdrawal of drugs found not to be effective in the NAS-NRC study, the FDA promulgated
regulations elaborating the types of "substantial evidence," as defined in the Act, necessary
to show drug efficacy. The regulations impose strict conditions on the conduct of clinical
studies. If the manufacturer cannot or does not submit adequate and well-controlled studies
after receiving notice from the FDA, the NDA is disapproved or withdrawn without an
opportunity for hearing. This summary judgment procedure was upheld in Weinberger v.
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
22
37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). The 25 percent figure may be somewhat misleading because the
panel members in the Drug Efficacy Study used a very exacting substantial evidence
requirement for an "effective" ranking, which led to liberal use of the "probably effective"
and "possibly effective" ratings. J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, supra note 14, at 471.
23
37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972).
24
21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(9) (1977).
25
A manufacturer is provided with a safe harbor from regulatory enforcement if it
complies with the terms of the monograph. One issue is whether the manufacturer will be
allowed to prove that the drug is GRAS&E and not misbranded under the statute if it does
not conform to the monograph. See notes 95-120 and accompanying text infra.
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· parameters of an applicable monograph are subject to regulatory action
by the FDA unless already covered by an approved NDA. 26
The misbranding 27 requirement is intended to circumvent the grandfather clauses exempting most OTC drugs from the "new drug" definition. 28 A drug whose label contains false representations is misbranded. 29
The final monograph specifies the labeling that must appear on drugs in
that therapeutic category. If its labeling is changed to avoid liability for
-misbranding, the drug loses its grandfather clause protection and falls
within the definition of a "new drug. " 30 Thus, the FDA has been able to
use the threat of misbranding sanctions to regulate the effectiveness of
grandfathered drugs through the OTC drug review. 31
To implement the new program the FDA formed scientific advisory
panels composed of eminent non-FDA medical experts to study OTC

26 C.F.R. § 330. IO(b)(l977). The OTC drug review does not supplant the NDA process
entirely, but rather provides an alternative procedure to follow. An expedited or abbreviated
version of an NDA can be utilized by making use of the final monograph. See 21 C.F.R.
§ 330.11 (1977). Abbreviated NDAs were originally used to implement the results of the
Drug Efficacy Study. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra. Drugs found "effective" by an NAS-NRC panel could be marketed. The abbreviated procedure was intended to
eliminate the need for redundant studies. McEniry, Drug Monographs, 29 Fooo DRUG
CosM. L.J. 166 (1974).
27
The Act provides that a drug shall be deemed misbranded if its labeling is in any way
false or misleading, if its labeling bears inadequate directions for use, or if it is dangerous to
health when used with the dosage, frequency, or duration prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (f), (i) (1970). The FDA's misbranding
authority is a carryover of its power under the 1906 Act, see note 9 supra, and is in addition
to its licensing power for "new drugs." Misbranding is a prohibited act, 21 U.S.C. § 33 l(b)
(1970), and involves the same sanctions as marketing a "new drug" without an NOA. See
note· 14 supra.
28
See note 17 s11pra.
29 See note 27 supra.
30
See note 17 supra.
31 The Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645
(1973), recognized the primary jurisdiction of the FDA over all issues pertaining to "new
drugs" rather than limiting the FDA to its express statutory jurisdiction, §§ 505(d) (disapproval of a submitted NOA) and 505(e) (withdrawal of an outstanding NDA). 412 U.S. at
652. The primary jurisdiction doctrine involves situations where both a court and an
administrative agency have concurrent original jurisdiction, yet it is presumed that the
agency is a better forum for reaching an initial decision. "The principal criterion in deciding
whether the doctrine is applicable usually is not legislative intent but is judicial appraisal of
need or lack of need for resort to administrative judgment." DA VIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT§ 19.06 (3d ed. 1972). The specialized expertise of an agency and the desirability for
uniformity are the usual justifications for according an agency primary jurisdiction. The
claim of the FDA's specialized expertise is buttressed when it relies on the expert advisory
panels.
While the Supreme Court has recognized the FDA's primary jurisdiction over the "new
drug" issue, it is unclear whether the FDA has primary jurisdiction to deterrn_ine misbranding of drugs. Misbranding has traditionally been resolved by the courts in individual enforcement proceedings. MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 541. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)
(1970) states that a misbranded drug "shall be liable to be proceeded against ... 'in any
district court ... "and does not mention administrative enforcement. See generally Ames &
McCracken, supra note 21, at 55-72, supporting primary jurisdiction over misbranding as it
pertains to the OTC drug review.
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drugs. 32 Twenty-six therapeutic drug categories were established, 33 and
seventeen panels were created to review these categories. 34 Each panel
was responsible for certain therapeutic categories. 35
The panels are expected to lay the groundwork for the monographs that
will govern the therapeutic drug categories. They are "to evaluate the
safety and effectiveness of OTC drugs, to review OTC drug labeling, and
to advise[the Commissioner] on the promulgation of monographs. " 36 The
panels may solicit opinions and information from any individual or
group, 37 and interested parties may submit data and opinions to the panels
for consideration. 38 After evaluation of the data, each panel submits a
report to the Commissioner containing its conclusions and recommendations, including a recommended monograph or monographs. 39
After receiving an advisory panel report, the Commissioner is to publish a proposed monograph, allowing ninety days for written comments
and an additional thirty days for reply comments. 40 After reviewing all
32
21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(l) (1977). The FDA has made extensive use of advisory panels
since the inception of the OTC drug review, 21 C.F.R. § 14.100 (1977); see generally
Schmidt, Communication as the Basis of Regulation, 29 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 9 (1974).
The advisory panel framework was explicitly endorsed by congressional legislation concerning the classification of medical devices intended for human use. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, § 2, 90 Stat. 540.
33
21 C. F.R. § 330.5 (1977). A catch-all category for miscellaneous products was divided
into the categories of internal and external products. Saccharin was initially included for
review in the Miscellaneous Internal Products Panel. 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,004 (1977).
34
The regulations provide that "a single advisory review panel shall be established for
each designated category of OTC drugs and every OTC drug category will be considered by
a panel." 21 C. F. R. § 330. lO(a)(I). Overlap between several categories led to their consolidation for consideration by only one panel, however. Yingling, The Over-The-CounterDrug-Review, 28 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 273 (1973). More comprehensive consideration of
combination drugs was given as ajustification for the consolidation. Id. A combination drug
is one that contains two or more active ingredients to treat multiple symptoms. See 21
C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(4)(iv) (1977) for the FDA's policy concerning combination OTC drugs.
35
21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(l) (1977).
36
37

Id.

Id.§ 330.10(a)(2) (1977).
Id. § 330. IO(a)(3).
39
Id. § 330.1 O(a)(5)(i). The report is a review of product ingredients and dosages, not a
review of individual brand-name products. The panels are asked to place ingredients in one
of three categories: Category I (GRAS&E); Category II (not GRAS&E); or Category III
(more studies necessary). 21 C.F.R. § 330. IO (1977). Category III drugs can be marketed
pending completion of the necessary studies under conditions prescribed by the FDA. 42
Fed. Reg. 19, 137 (1977). There is no provision in the law for a Category III listing, and such
status may be incompatible with continued lawful marketing absent an approved NDA. The
issue is being litigated in Health Research Group v. Kennedy, Civ. No. 77-0734 (D.D.C.).
With submission of the final report, the FDA terminates the panel pursuant to 21 C.F.R. §
14.55 (1977), and deletes it from the list of standing advisory panels in§ 14.100. For example,
the Laxative, Antidiarrheal, Emetic and Antiemitic Drug Panel was terminated on July 17,
1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 41,851 (1977). Interestingly, its conclusions were published more than
two years earlier. 40 Fed. Reg. 12,902 (1975). This panel was one of those recommended for
elimination in President Carter's reorganization plan. See The President's Advisory Committee Reduction Program, Prepared by the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 78
(1977).
40
21 C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(6). The reply comments are to respond to initial comments rather
than to reiterate previously indicated positions. Id. Originally, sixty days were allowed for
written comments but this period was extended to ninety days. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,800 (1977).
21 C.F.R. §330.IO(a)(6) (1977) has not yet been revised to reflect this change.
38
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comments, a tentative final monograph is to be published, allowing thirty
days for specific written objections and requests for an oral hearing.41
After reviewing written objections and considering arguments made at
any hearing, the Commissioner publishes the final monograph. 42
There are several advantages to the FDA's rulemaking approach. First,
given the large number of OTC drugs on the market, case-by-case review
would put a tremendous burden on the limited resources of the FDA as
well as on the courts, the pharmaceutical industry, and the scientific
community. 43 Moreover, the FDA, in its own estimation, has been quite
unsuccessful in proceeding on a case-by-case basis. 44 Second, the length
of time required for case-by-case review leads to inequitable results; some
products remain on the market indefinitely while similar drugs are subjected to legal action. 45 Third, rulemaking for specific OTC drug categories is practical and more efficient because OTC drugs are composed of
relatively few active ingredients. 46

41
21 C.F.R. § 330. IO(a)(7) (1977). Both reply comments and tentative final monograph are
innovative administrative procedures. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides
for two basic rulemaking models: informal "notice and comment" procedures of§ 4(b) of
the APA, 5 U .S.C. § 553(c) (1977). and formal rulemaking under§§ 6, 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556, 557 (1977). The FDA is relying on§ 701(a) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970),
as authority for the review. Formal rulemaking is not required because § 701(a) does not
require rulemaking to be "on the record." See United States v. Florida East Coast Railway
Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
Although formal rulemaking appears unnecessary, the informal "notice and comment"
procedures provided by the APA may be deficient under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment because of the importance of the monographs. The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals has expressed approval of "notice and comment-plus" procedure. Mobil Oil
Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International HarvestorCorp. v. Ruckelhaus,
478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing a limited right of cross-examination); Walter Holm
& Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L.
REV. 401 (1975). The FDA has not provided the opportunity for cross-examination at any
stage during the OTC drug review, but it is evidently hoped that the inclusion of reply
comments and tentative final monographs will comport with expanded notions of due
process in supplementing the APA's "notice and comment" procedures. Cross-examination
is not a requisite element whenever "notice and comment-plus" ruiemaking is necessary;
courts have been more concerned with ensuring a thorough ventilation of the issues rather
than the means used by the agency to discuss these issues. National Research Defense
Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1976). ·
Cross-examination would permit more meaningful court review, but the potential for delay
makes it an unattractive alternative for the FDA. The classic paradigm of delay associated
with cross-examination is the ten year proceeding conducted under the formal rulemaking
procedures of 21 U .S.C. § 701(e) (1970), concerning the quantity of peanuts in a product
required before the product could be labeled "peanut butter." Hamilton, Rule making on a
Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX. L. REv. 1132, 1142-45 (1972).
42
21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a)(9) (1977).
43
37 Fed. Reg. 85, 86 (1972). The desirability of a therapeutic class approach received
endorsement in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceutical, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973).
44
See generally Use of Advisory Committees by the Food and Drug Administration Part
II: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations and Human Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., )st Sess. 65-72
(1975) (testimony of Peter Baron Hutt, former FDA Chief Counsel) [hereinafter cited as
Advisory Committee Hearings].
45
This inequity was recognized in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S.
645, 653 (1973), which upheld the FDA's primary jurisdiction over the "new drug" issue.
46
37 Fed. Reg. 85, 86 (1972).
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Except for cases of patent fraud or serious health hazard, a moratorium
on drug enforcement is in effect until publication of a final monograph for
a particular therapeutic category. 47 The moratorium has been defended
on the grounds that the long term benefits outweigh the short term
dislocations. 48 It has created several problems, however. First, enforcement is delayed during the lengthy time period between panel
recommendations and the promulgation of the final monograph. 49 The
delays have been criticized by members of the House Committee on
Governmental Operations as being detrimental to the public by permitting
the continued marketing of ineffective drugs. 50 On balance, however, it
would appear appropriate to stay enforcement unless continued marketing poses a health threat. 51
Second, the moratorium has encouraged some manufacturers to convert their prescription drugs to OTC status. A manufacturer may decide
on its own to market a drug OTC, 52 gambling that it is GRAS&E as an
OTC drug and thus not subject to regulatory action for not having an
approved NDA. 53 The FDA has expressly approved use of the OTC drug
review as a means for converting from prescription to OTC status. 54 The
OTC drug panels may review any prescription drugs which they believe
can be safely and effectively used as OTC drugs, 55 and a drug manufacturer may specifically request an advisory panel to review a particular
prescription drug. 56
As a result of the drug moratorium, a few manufacturers marketed
drugs OTC on the basis of preliminary panel findings instead of waiting

47
See Pineo, The FDA's OTC Drug Review - The Light at the End of the Tunnel, 31 FooD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 141 (1976). After promulgation of the final monograph, there is a certain
period of time before enforcement begins for drugs in that therapeutic category. See 42 Fed.
Reg. 35,346 (1977).
A number of exceptions to the moratorium have been established. Perhaps the most
prominent example is the FDA's 1972 restrictions on the use of hexachlorophene, an
antibacterial agent, because of the health threat it posed to infants. 37 Fed. Reg. 20,160
(1972). The FDA's position is now contained at 21 C.F.R. § 250.250 (1977).
48
Advisory Committee Hearings, supra note 44 at 70 (testimony of Peter Baron Hutt,
former FDA Chief Counsel). The primary benefit of the OTC drug review will be the
expeditious enforcement mechanism available to the FDA. The short term detriment is the
suspension, as a practical matter, of drug enforcement against OTC drugs.
49
For example, on September 13, 1974, the Commissioner issued a proposal to establish a
monograph for OTC topical antimicrobial products for daily human use along with the report
of the OTC Antimicrobial I Panel which was responsible for that category. 39 Fed. Reg.
33,103 (1974). Publication of the tentative final monograph did not occur until January 6,
1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 1,210 (1978).
50
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, USE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES BY THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, H.R. REP. No. 94-787, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976)
(hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT).
51
Advisory Committee Hearings. supra note 44 at 75.
52
A drug manufacturer may also petition the FDA for approval of supplemental NDAs
permitting OTC sale under the FDA switch regulations. 21 C.F.R. § 310.200 (1977).
53
The drug will have an NOA for prescription but not OTC distribution. The marketing
history of the prescription drug may indicate to the manufacturer that OTC status may be
legitimately claimed.
54
41 Fed. Reg. 32,58-0 (1976).
55
21 C.F.R. § 310.IO(a)(2) (1977).
56
Id. § 310.IO(a)O).
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for publication of the final monograph. 57 In response, the FDA published
so-called "anti jump-the-gun" regulations which limit the permissible
circumstances for conversions under the OTC drug review. 58 Basically,
any prescription drug marketed OTC prior to the publication of the
proposed monograph will be subject to regulatory action. 59 After publication of the proposed monograph and before the effective date of the final
monograph, a prescription drug found by the panel to be GRAS&E and
not misbranded can be marketed but is subject to the risk that the
Commissioner will not accept the panel findings and will take regulatory
action. 60
B. OTC Advisory Panels

The regulations establishing the OTC drug review provide that panel
members shall be qualified experts appointed by the Commissioner and
"may include persons from lists submitted by organizations representing
professional, consumer, and industry interests. " 61 The actual selection of
panel members has shown a heavy dependence upon the academic community. 62 Pharmaceutical manufacturers have criticized this practice on
the theory that academics may be biased against OTC drugs. 63 The
industry argues that they are exposed to patients whose attempts at
self-medication have failed rather than to the majority of cases where
OTC drugs have given relief. 64 However, caution in reviewing the drugs is

57

Pineo, supra note 47, at 144.
41 Fed. Reg. 32,580 (1976).
59
21 C.F.R. § 330.13(a) (1977).
60
Id.§ 330.13(b)(2). The drug must also be marketed in compliance with the terms of a
proposed or tentative final monograph to avoid regulatory action. Id. § 330.13(b)(2). A drug
found by the panel to be Category II (not GRAS&E or misbranded) requires an approved
NDA before being marketed as an OTC drug. Id. § 330.13(c)(2). A drug found by the panel to
be Category III (more studies necessary) requires either a determination by the Commissioner that the drug is GRAS&E or an approved NOA before marketing is permitted. Id.
§ 330.13(d)(2).
61
Id. § 330. IO(a)(l). Allowing the regulated industry a voice in the selection of panelists
may raise the spectre of "crony ism" between the FDA and the industry. However, a former
FDA chief counsel has said that "in the OTC Drug Review we have, if anything, gone
overboard in making certain that everybody has an opportunity to participate." Hutt, Views
on Supreme Court/FDA Decisions, 28 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 662, 666 (1973). The Commissioner is not required to include panelists from the submitted lists, but the opportunity to
submit names is another facet of the FDA's desire to go beyond mere "notice and comment" rulemaking. See note 41 supra.
62
By way of illustration, the voting members of the Internal Analgesic and Antirheumatic
Review Panel, which submitted its final report April 5, 1977, are as follows: Weldon
Bellville, M.D., Chairman from August 1976, University of California, school of medicine,
replacing Henry W. Elliott, M.D., Ph.D., who died in August 1976; William Barr, Ph.D.,
Virginia Medical College, pharmacy dept.; Ninfa Redmond, Ph.D., Concordia University,
Montreal, Quebec, Canada; Naomi Rothfield, M.D., University of Connecticut, school of
medicine; George Sharpe, M.D., National Bureau of Standards, health unit. 42 Fed. Reg.
35,347 (1977).
63
O'Keefe, The Over-the-Counter Drug Review-Helping the Client Make Decisions, 29
Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 262, 271 (1974); DiPrima, The OTC Review - Viewpoint of the
Industry House Counsel, 27 Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 532, 540 (1972).
64
O'Keefe, supra note 63 at 271. As a factual matter, however, many conditions are
self-alleviating.
58
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desirable, and the selection of qualified experts not associated with the
academic community should not be sine qua non of an effective advisory
panel. The relevant pool of expertise outside academia is limited to
physicians and pharmacists in private practice or associated with the
pharmaceutical industry. Private practitioners are subject to the same
concerns about bias as members of the academic community, 65 and
choosing panel members associated with the pharmaceutical industry
poses obvious conflict of interest problems. 66 In any event, the preeminent concern should be obtaining a diversity of qualified expertise
capable of evaluating drugs in the given therapeutic category. 67
In addition to voting panel members, two liaison members are included
on each panel, one representing industry interests and the other
representing consumer interests. 68 The primary purpose of the liaison
members is to instill confidence in the OTC drug review by keeping the
lines of communication open; they are to act as conduits between the
panel and the interests they represent. 69
Special problems arise because of the representative status of the
liaison members. Although the industry liaison is to represent the industry
as a whole, 70 it is possible that a member will act in the interests of a
particular manufacturer rather than another manufacturer or the rest of
the industry. For example, studies submitted for panel consideration
containing trade secrets could be conveyed to the manufacturer's competitor. To minimize this danger, certain safeguards have been developed
to prevent the industry liaison from being exposed to confidential material. 11

65
An individual is likely to first resort to self-medication, contacting a physician only if
the symptoms persist. Note that many medical professors also maintain private practices.
66
Voting members must be cleared as special government employeees who have no
personal financial stake in the outcome and no significant ties to pharmaceutical manufacturers or sellers. 21 C.F.R. § 14.80(a)(2) (1977).
67
Id. § 14.SO(b)(l)(i). Panels are to consist of individuals with expertise in the particular
subject matter under consideration. The members are also to "have diverse professional
education, training, and experience so that the committee will reflect a balanced composi_tion of sufficient scientific expertise to handle the problems that come before it." Id.
A scientific challenge to panel expertise might arise with the miscellaneous panels.
Relatively unrelated categories are combined in the miscellaneous grouping, and it has been
charged that the miscellaneous panels have evaluated drugs more properly within the
expertise of specialized panels. DiPrima, supra note 7, at 408.
68
21 C.F.R § 14.84(a) (1977). The FDA was cognizant of criticism leveled at the NASNRC panels, see text accompanying notes 20-22 supra, due to the closed nature of the
deliberations and the preponderance of panelists from academia. Advisory Committee
Hearings, supra note 44, at 339 (testimony of Peter Baron Hutt, former FDA Chief Counsel).
69
The liaison members function in much the same manner, including the approval of
panel minutes and planning future meetings, but they do not have the right to vote on
substantive matters such as establishing the recommended monographs. 21 C.F.R. §
14.86(a)(I) (1977). Additionally, their advocacy is limited in that they are not to exercise
undue influence over other members of the advisory panel. Id. § 14.86(c)(6). Although the
regulations do not clearly delineate when a liaison member abuses his or her position, the
Commissioner has the power to remove any member who exceeds permissible bounds. Id. §
14.86(d).
70
Id. § 14.86(c)(4).
?1 First, the industry liaison is not allowed to attend meetings whenever the topic covers
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The major problem with the consumer liaison member involves the
initial selection process. 72 The FDA initiaJly turned to an ad hoc consortium of consumer organizations and asked them to choose a representative, not questioning their selection. 73 However, to formalize the selection of consumer liaison members and to make the selection more democratic, the FDA made several changes in procedure. Generally, nominations are received by the FDA, and consumer groups registered with the
FDA vote for one of the nominees. 74 These changes will be of limited use
in the OTC drug review because it is nearing completion, but the future
selection of liaison members in other programs will be benefited by the
procedures developed.
The FDA has also promulgated regulations concerning the right of the
public to attend panel meetings, 75 as well as the coroJlary right of access
to panel meeting records. 76 The regulations generally provide that the
meetings will be open unless trade secrets or information that invades an
individual's privacy will be discussed. 77

"trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information." Id. § 14.27(c)(l).
Second, the industry liaison is barred access to such information even after it has been
discussed by other members in a closed meeting. Id. § 14.86(a)(2).
72
The FDA leaves the ultimate selection of liaison members to the respective groups.
However, unlike the drug industry with its well-established trade associations, consumers
are not uniformly represented. The Proprietary Association represents the OTC drug industry while the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association represents 90 percent of the manu~
facturers of prescription drugs and those OTC drugs used in health professions. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 138 (1967). On the other hand, consumers are an
amorphous category without substantial internal cohesiveness, and consumer groups are
often self-appointed representatives representing different segments of the consuming public. Nonetheless, the consumer liaison member will help allay suspicion of "cronyism"
between the FDA and the regulated industry by serving as a counter-weight to the industry
liaison.
73
The organizations included the Consumer Federation of America, the Consumers
Union, and the Federation of Homemakers of America. See generally Advisory Committee
Hearings, supra note 44, at 136.
74
Notice will now be published in the Federal Register requesting nominations for the
particular advisory panel. 21 C.F.R. § 14.84(c) (1977). Although nominations can come from
any interested person, individuals are encouraged to submit the nominations through FDA
recognized groups. Id. § 14.84(c)(I). Although these groups are entitled to vote on the
nominees, id. § 14.84(c)(3), the FDA limits the number of nominees, id. § 14.84(c)(4). The
ballots and the curriculum vitae of the eligible nominees are sent to recognized organizations
on file with the FDA, and the individual receiving the plurality of votes will be the consumer
liaison member. Id. § 14.84(c)(4).
75
41 Fed. Reg. 52,147 (1976); codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 14 (1977).
76

77

Jd.

Id. Initially, many OTC advisory panels routinely closed meetings to the public on the
ground that the deliberations, if transcribed, would constitute inter- or intra-departmental
memoranda within the meaning of one of the exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U .S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970). This conclusion derived from language in the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 86 Stat. 770 ( 1972). The panels are advisory committees under§ 3(2) of the
FACA. Section IO(a)(l) of the FACA states that "each advisory committee meeting shall be
open to the public," but subsection (d) qualifies this requirement by stating that § I O(a)(I)
does not apply to any meeting excepted by the FOIA.
Section IO(d) was amended by the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1247 (1976),
to discontinue reliance upon 5 U .S.C. § 552(b). The determination to close a meeting must
now be made in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) (1976) (also a part of the Sunshine
Act). The applicable agency has to properly determine the disclosure of information would
fall into certain enumerated categories. The FDA regulations concerning advisory panels
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The minutes of panel meetings are also available for public inspection. 78 While minutes should not disclose confidential information, it is
important to ensure that they contain enough specificity so that the public
right of access is not eviscerated. The Federal Advisory Committee Act
requires that "detailed minutes of each meeting of each advisory committee shall be kept and shall contain a record of the persons present, a
complete and accurate description of matters discussed and conclusions
reached.' ' 79 Detailed minutes not only protect the public right of access to
information, but also check against undue pressure by FDA personnel
over panel members. 80

III. SELECTED PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE OTC DRUG REVIEW

A. Panel Recommendations and "New Drug" Status

Panel members are eminent experts in their fields, and the statute
closely conform to the Sunshine Act by permitting only those closings allowable under 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 21 C.F.R. § 14.27(b)(2) (1977). Generally, a meeting now may be closed
only upon the Commissioner's determination and justification in the Federal Register. 21
C.F.R. § 14.27(b) (1977).
The regulations also require every panel meeting to have an open hearing component in
which an interested party may participate through written and oral presentations. Id. §
14.27(a). It is now possible that a meeting can have four separate segments: an open public
hearing, open panel deliberations where the public can only observe, closed presentation of
exempted data, and closed committee deliberations subject to the written authorization of
the Commissioner. Id. § 14.25.
78
The transcripts and minutes of the open portions of the meetings are publicly available,
21 C.F.R. § 14.74(a)(2), (3) (1977), as are the written data submitted for the panel's
consideration during an open meeting. Id. § 14.75(a)(I), (5). A brief summary of a closed
portion is available upon demand. Id. § 14.75(a)(4). Even if material is found confidential,
the minutes of the executive portion of the meeting can be released if the panel report or
advice has received action, or the Commissioner determines that the minutes or portions
thereof can be open to public disclosure without undue interference to panel or agency
operations. Id. § 14.75(a)(6).
79
Section IO(c), 86 Stat. 770.
80
An example is the OTC Antacid Panel deliberations regarding the proposed removal of
Alka-Seltzer from the market. Some panel members almost resigned because of "what they
regarded as 'insuperable' restrictions placed upon their independent consideration of scientific evidence." ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 50, at 61-62. Detailed records
would have allowed an independent determination as to whether the FDA did exert undue
pressure upon panel members. In this instance, the independent determination would have
been made by the Congressional Subcommittee studying FDA use of advisory committees.
Id.
Unlike the Drug Efficacy Study, discussed in the text accompanying notes 20-22 supra,
the FDA has taken an active role in the OTC drug review. FDA facilities and personnel are
available to the panels, and the FDA Chief Counsel made introductory remarks to each of
the panels outlining the purposes and procedures to be followed. ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 50, at 8. Members of the Chief Counsel's staff regularly attend panel
meetings, and preliminary panel reports ai:e reviewed by the staff for ambiguities and
inconsistencies. The purpose of increased FDA participation is to avoid problems of the
Drug Efficacy Study; the N AS-NRC panels were totally disassociated from the FDA and
operated without communication between each other. Consequently, the standards used in
evaluating the effective NDAs varied greatly from one panel to another. MASHAW &
MERRILL, supra note 14, at 471.
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defines a "new drug" as a drug not generally recognized by experts as
safe and effective. 81 It has thus been suggested that a panel determination
that a drug is safe and effective for OTC distribution might automatically
remove the drug from the "new drug" category. 82 This question of
administrative delegation arose in conjunction with Parke, Davis & Company v. Mathews, 83 which involved OTC marketing of Benylin Cough
Syrup. Parke, Davis submitted data on Benylin to the Cough, Cold,
Allergy, Bronchodilator and Antiasthmatic Drug P~nel (CCABA Panel)
for OTC review. 84 The CCABA Panel recommended approval of the
active ingredient in Benylin, 85 but the Commissioner issued a proposed
monograph disagreeing with the panel's conclusions. 86 Parke, Davis then
brought suit in federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment that
Benylin is not a "new drug," and in the alternative, that the FDA be
enjoined from initiating enforcement action pending final determination of
Benylin's status. The court di9 not grant the declaratory judgment87 but
did enjoin enforcement until thirty days after the FDA's final determination.88
In making its holding, the court did not treat the panel recommendations as binding on the FDA. 89 The court was clearly correct in this
regard. The purpose of the panels is "to advise [the Commissioner] on the
promulgation of monographs." 90 The FOA is empowered to administratively determine the sufficiency of evidence concerning general recognition .91 Any delegation of this power9 2 would be an abdication of the

81

Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 201(p)(I), 21 U.S.C. § 32l(p)(I) (1962).
The Pink Sheet, FDC REl'ORTS, December 6, 1976, at 16. As a practical matter, the
Commissioner will usually abide by panel findings. However, it is unlikely that any interested parties would be willing to forego the procedural safeguards provided before
publication of the final monograph. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
83
Parke, Davis & Company v. Mathews, No. 6-72464, memorandum opinion, (E.D.
'Mich. Jan. 7, 1977) (on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
84
Id. at 3. Prescription sale previously had been the only authorized method of distribution. See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra concerning the conversion of prescription drugs to OTC status.
85
41 Fed. Reg. 38,311, 38,340 (1976). During this time, Parke, Davis also filed for two
supplemental NDAs but the FDA deferred action on these applications until completion of
the OTC drug review. Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 3.
86 Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 4. At the same time, a denial of the supplemental ND As
was published. Id. at 5.
87
The court concluded that "these issues are currently under consideration by the FDA
which has primary jurisdiction over such actions." Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 7.
88
The court found that Parke, Davis has relied on prior FDA assurances that OTC
marketing was permissible so that the present action withdrawing Benylin was arbitrary and
capricious. Parke, Davis, supra note 83, at 9.
89
However, the court was influenced in its decision by the fact that "the advisory panel
made a thorough study of the drug, its recommendation is supported by the affidavits of
several other eminent experts in the field, and, in contrast, the Commissioner's tentative
decision not to permit OTC sale is rather incompletely supported." Parke, Dai•is, supra note
83, at 9. Such a situation will be a relevant consideration when the manufacturer seeks
pre-enforcement judicial review of the final monograph. See notes 121-40 and accompanying
text infra.
90
21 C.F.R. § 330.lO(a)(I) (1977) (emphasis added).
91
The FDA's primary jurisdiction over the "new drug" definition was recognized in
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653 (1973).
92
The FDA has not delegated this power to the panels and has very clearly reserved the
82
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FDA 's statutory responsibilities 93 and would raise the spectre of private
government. 94
B. Legislative-Interpretive Issue

The final monographs issued by the FDA should be characterized by
the courts in enforcement proceedings 95 as legislative rather than interpretive.96 A legislative rule is as valid and binding upon a court as a
statute if it is within the granted power, issued pursuant to proper procedure, and reasonable. 97 On the other hand, agency interpretations of
substantive legislation have been viewed as ''not controlling upon the
courts by reason of their authority [but merely] a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance. " 98
It has been suggested that this distinction is of no practical significance
because of the judicial deference routinely accorded all technical administrative regulations. 99 Judicial deference, however, will be much less pronounced if the panel report is at odds with the final monograph as
promulgated by the FDA. 100 A court probably will be more willing to
support the Commissioner if the final monograph is supported by a
comprehensive panel report.
More importantly, if the monographs are interpretive, the court enpower to disagree with the panels. See Advisory Committee Hearings, supra note 44, at 157.
The regulations creating the panels provide that they are to "advise" the Commissioner. 21
C.F.R. § 330. lO(a)(l) (1977).
93
The doctrine of subdelegation (i.e., the delegation of power from an agency head to a
lower official) has not been frequently invoked by the courts to invalidate agency action,
DAVIS, supra note 31, § 9.01, but could be invoked here. Although panelists are special
government employees, they resemble a private group more closely than do other agency
personnel.
94
Hoffman, After the Glorious Revolution: Thoughts for Food and Drug Lawyers on the
New Regime, 29 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 234, 239 (1974).
95 The FDA ultimately must resort to the courts for enforcement. See note 14 supra.
96
Most commentators have phrased the issue as between "substantive" and "interpretive." This note uses the word "legislative" in the place of "substantive" to avoid confusion with substantive-procedural distinctions.
97
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 5.03 (1958). The reasonableness requirement is said to stem "both from the idea of constitutional due process and from the idea of
statutory interpretation that legislative bodies are assumed to intend to avoid the delegation
of power to act unreasonably." Id. As to challenging the reasonableness of monographs, see
text accompanying notes 121-40 infra. Davis states that
[a]n interpretive rule may or may not have the force of law, depending upon such
factors as (a) whether the court agrees or disagrees with the rule, (b) the extent to
which the subject matter is within special administrative competence and beyond
general judicial competence, (c) whether the rule is a contemporaneous construction of the statute by those who are assigned the task of implementing and enforcing the statute, (d) whether the rule is one of long standing, and (e) whether the
statute has been reenacted by legislators who know the content of the rule. Id.,§
5.03.
98
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
99 Harlow, The FDA's OTC Drug Review: The Development and an Analysis of Some
Aspects of the Procedure, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 248, 255 ( 1977). The practical effect of
such deference is that the regulation is legislative.
100
See notes 87-93 and accompanying text supra concerning the Benylin controversy. In
particular, see note 89 supra.
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forcement proceedings must determine whether the drug is GRAS&E and
not misbranded. If the monographs are legislative, the issue before the
court is limited to whether the drug complies with the monograph. The
FDA clearly is seeking to avoid the potential for protracted litigation
inherent in interpretive rules. By defining the critical statutory terms by
legislative regulation, the FDA can avoid the potential for protracted
litigation inherent in interpretive rules. Given the FDA 's need for expeditious enforcement procedures and its capacity to resolve complex
scientific issues, monographs should be accorded legislative status.
The significance of the potential for delay can best be understood by
examining the FDA 's pre-OTC drug review procedures. The FDA has
sought to expedite enforcement by using summary judgment motions
supported by affidavits of medical experts, contending that affidavits
denying a drug's general recognition would be conclusive in establishing it
as a "new drug. " 101 The FD A's position has not been well received by
the courts. Although one court allowed summary judgment where both
the manufacturer and the FDA submitted affidavits as to "general recognition,"102 subsequent decisions have permitted summary judgment only
when affidavits submitted by defendants did not even make a prima facie
case of "general recognition. " 103 As a result, the FDA cannot be assured
of summary judgment whenever the manufacturer produces affidavits
tending to show that the particular product is GRAS&E.
A final monograph eliminates reliance on affidavits and the inherent
delay in obtaining them, 104 but the same judicial uncertainty as to the
appropriateness of summary disposition is likely if the monographs are
given interpretive effect. A court ultimately may abide by the monograph
regardless of its characterization, but permitting the case to come to trial
on the issues of G RAS&E and misbranding introduces time delay. Giving
the monograph legislative effect would lead to administrative resolution,
and remove the manufacturers' incentive to engage in protracted litigation.1os

101
MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 464. See generally Advisory Committee
Hearings, supra note 44, at 45-50.
The FDA has also tried to show lack of general recognition by demonstrating an absence
of any medical or scientific literature. The theory is that general recognition cannot exist in
the absence of such literature because of exchanging information about a drug's safety or
effectiveness. See United States v. An Article of Drug Labeled "Entrol-C Medicated," 362
F. Supp. 424 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd, 513 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1975).
102
Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418 (D.D.C. 1958).
103
United States v. 7 Cartons••• Ferro-Lac, 293 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D. Ill. 1968), affd
424 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1970) (criticizing Merritt as equating "general recognition" with
unanimity); AMP v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 831 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 825
(1968) (allowing summary judgment because the FDA affidavit was addressed to the lack of
"general recognition" while the AMP affidavit was one doctor's opinion as to safety
unsupported by other affidavits). The AMP court expressed reservations about summary
judgments whenever there are affidavits presenting not only a difference of opinion as to
safety but also as to "general recognition." Id. at 831.
10
• Obtaining the affidavits of eminent experts is itself time consuming. See Advisory
Committee Hearings, supra note 44, at 44, concerning the FDA's efforts in removing Vice
Spice, a fraudulent aphrodisiac containing paprika, from the market.
105
Harlow, supra note 99, at 258-59. Manufacturers will concentrate their energies on the
advisory panels. The comments to the proposed OTC drug review indicated that "the
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The monographs are promultaged under Section 70l(a) of the 1938 Act.
Section 70l(a) generally vests authority to promulgate regulations for the
efficient enforcement of the Act in the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), 106 who has delegated this power to the Commissioner of
the FDA.'°. 7 The FDA contends that Section 70l(a) allows it "to proceed
by substantive rule making rather than on a case-by-case basis, to particularize general statutory standards." 108
The pharmaceutical industry claims that Congress never intended Section 70l(a) to give the FDA authority to promulgate legislative regulations.109 One commentator notes that Section 70l(e) specifically permits
legislative rulemaking in certain situations and that the lack of similar
language in Section 70l(a) means that legislative authority was not intended for regulations under Section 70l(a)." 0 The legislative history
reveals that Section 70l(e) regulations were intended to "have the force
of law and must be observed"'" while no such statement was made for
Section 70l(a). In addition, Section 70l(e) contains a number of procedural protections which are not present in Section 70l(a). 112
Judicial treatment of similar regulatory schemes nonetheless indicates
that the final monographs should be given a legislative characterization .113 The Second Circuit's decision in National Nutritional Foods

regulations will be substantially followed by the industry." 37 Fed. Reg. 85 (1972). Compliance may be forthcoming regardless of the characterization of the monographs as legislative or interpretive, but the likelihood of compliance is greater if manufacturers are exposed
to summary court procedures. See notes 121-40 and accompanying text infra concerning
those situations where a manufacturer is supported by a comprehensive panel report, but the
Commissioner fails to abide by panel recommendations.
106
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 70l(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1970).
101
5 C.F.R. § 5.l(a)(l) (1977).
108
37 Fed. Reg. at 9,471, ,I 85 (1972).
109
Bass, ls the Substantive-Interpretive Issue Really Dead?, 30 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J.
448 (1975); Whyte, The FDA's OTC Drug Review, 28 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 381, 384-388
(1973); DiPrima, The OTC Review - Viewpoint of the Industry House Counsel, 27 FooD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 532 (1972); Levine, Legal Ramifications of the OTC Drug Review, 27
Fooo DRUG CosM. L.J. 571 (1972).
110
DiPrima, supra note 109, at 534-35.
111
H. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (1938).
112 21 u.s.c. § 371 (1970).
113 The FDA points to Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973),
as demonstrating judicial acceptance of the monographs' legislative character. In its brief to
the Court, the FDA characterized the May, 1972 regulations as "a procedure for determining in substantive rule-making, by therapeutic class, whether particular OTC products not
covered by NDA's are generally recognized as safe and effective and not misbranded .... "
Petitioner's brief, at 24. The Court did take cognizance of the OTC drug review and
described its operation during the course of the opinion, 412 U.S. at 650, but the legislative
issue was not before the Court.
The court in National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), upheld the FTC's legal authority to promulgate
legislative trade regulation rules (TRRs) for the purpose of carrying out the agency's duties
in preventing "unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). The FTC derives its authority to issue
regulations from section 6(g) of the FTC Act, 15 U .S.C. § 46(g) (1970), which provides that
the Commission has the power " ... to make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title." This case is
analogous because the FDA has similarly broad powers under section 70l(a) of the Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act. See also Mourning v. Family Publication Services, Inc., 411 U.S.
356 (1973).
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Ass'n v. Weinberger, 114 upholding regulations classifying vitamins A and
D in excess of specified dosages as prescription drugs, 115 provides particularly strong support for the legislative effect of the monographs. The
court construed Section 70l(a) as giving the FDA authority "to promulgate substantive regulations having the binding force of law rather than
mere 'interpretive' statements enforceable only on a case-by-case
basis. " 116 The court found the general delegation of authority in Section
701(a) sufficient to sustain legislative rulemaking. 117 The specific procedures set forth in Section 70l(e) were found to be in addition to and not in
derogation of the general rulemaking power under Section 70l(a). 118 The
court emphasized the lack of any legislative rulemaking prohibition under
Section 70l(a) rather than express recognition of such power in Section
701(e). 119 The Second Circuit's analysis of Section 70l(a) is equally applicable to the OTC drug review, and has been so interpreted by commentators . 120
C. Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review
Although the amended 1938 Act contains no provision for judicial review of regulations promulgated under the authority of Section 70l(a), 121
a manufacturer has at least two ways of challenging monographs in court.
It can resist, as a defendant in an enforcement proceeding, by contesting
the validity of the final order. 122 Alternatively, a manufacturer may seek
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief' 23 in an action for preenforcement review. 124

114
512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). The trial court had
referred to the OTC drug regulations as "of clearly substantive proportion" during the
course of its opinion. 376 F. Supp. 142, 147 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
115 All preparations of vitamin A containing more than 10,000 IU (international units) per
dosage form and of vitamin D containing more that 400 IU per dosage form were prescription drugs. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,723 (1973).
116
512 F.2d at 697.
117 Id. at 696.
118 "Where once we may have demanded proof of specific delegation of legislative
authority to an agency purporting to promulgate substantive rules we have learned from
experience to accept a general delegation as sufficient in certain areas of expertise." Id. at
696.
119 Id. at 698.
12
0 Ames & McCracken, supra note 21, at 57.
121 Review by the court of appeals is explicitly provided for by regulations promulgated
under section 701(e). The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,§ 701(f}, 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970).
122
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),§ lO(b}, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1977). See also DAVIS,
supra note 97, § 23.07.
123
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)§ !O(b), 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1977). See also DAVIS,
supra, note 97, § 23.04.
A preliminary issue is whether the federal district court has jurisdiction over the controversy. 28 U. S.C. § 133 l(a) (1970) formerly required an amount in controversy exceeding
$10.000, but the 1976 amendments to the APA eliminated this requirement, 28 U.S.C.A. §
1331(a) (West Supp. 1978). The Supreme Court has recently ruled that section IO of the APA
does not provide an independent grant of subject matter jurisdiction permitting federal
judicial review of agency action. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
124
Pre-enforcement review of interpretive regulations promulgated under the authority of
section 701(a) of the 1938 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 371_(a) (1970), was at one time thought to be
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The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) determines the scope of
judicial review in these actions. The FDA promulgates the monographs
under the "notice and comment" procedures of Section 4(b) of the
APA 125 rather than the formal "on the record" rulemaking of Sections 6
and 7. 126 Although the APA is not clear, it is generally assumed that
review under informal "notice and comment" rulemaking is governed by
an "arbitrary or capricious" standard 127 rather than the "substantial
evidence" test 128 followed for formal rulemaking. 129
Courts under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard have generally
been more tolerant of administrative action than under the "substantial
evidence" test. 130 This standard may still require close judicial examination. The Second Circuit in Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger
concluded "even under the 'arbitrary, capricious' st_andard agency action
will not be upheld where the inadequacy of explanation frustrates review."
... 131 There is a trend towards increased judicial scrutiny ofadministrative actions under the "arbitrary or capricious" test. 132 Judge Lumbard's concurring opinion in National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger merges the two standards: "when an agency engages in substantive rulemaking, it abuses its discretion (or acts arbitrarily or capriciously)
if its actions are not supported by substantial evidence." 133
The FDA's use of outside experts in the formulation of monographs has
led some commentators to suggest that courts are unlikely to find FDA

unavailable; challenge had to come during an enforcement proceeding. Bass, supra note 109,
at 450. This position is not tenable after Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967). Abbott Laboratories had the option of complying with regulations of debatable
validity requiring the generic name of a prescription drug to follow each appearance of the
proprietary name on the drug label or facing regulatory enforcement. The Court held this
dilemma presented a sufficient controversy to warrant judicial review prior to FDA enforcement. 387 U.S. at 152-154. The same dilemma faces OTC drug manufacturers concerning compliance with the final monograph. Compliance with the monograph may entail
relabeling or recomposition of the product, while non-compliance assures regulatory action
which can be costly in terms of public image and litigation expenses.
125
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970). The FDA has added several procedural steps such as reply
comments and a tentative final monograph so as to meet the possible judicial requirements
of "notice and comment-plus" rulemaking. See note 41 supra.
126
5 u.s.c. §§ 556, 557 (1970).
127
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § IO(e)(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
128
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),§ IO(e)(2)(E). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970).
129
National Ass'n of Food Chains v. I.C.C., 535 F.2d 1308, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
It has been asserted that the monographs, if given interpretive effect, should be reviewed
under the "substantial evidence" test. Harlow, supra note 99, at 254. Interpretive rules are
exempt from the "notice and comment" procedures of section 553. A "substantial evidence" test, however, seems untenable because the monographs are not promulgated under
the formal rulemaking procedures of sections 556 and 557. However, courts will give less
deference to interpretive rules than to legislative regulations, Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d
82, 88 (5th Cir. 1974), and the scope of review may lie somewhere between that for
legislative rules and that for agency adjudications. Opelika Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 1338. 1341-42 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
130
MASHAW & MERRILL, supra note 14, at 262-63.
131
512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975).
132
See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402 (1971); National Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1973).
133
512 F.2d at 705.
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action in promulgating monographs arbitrary or capricious . 134 Where the
Commissioner does not follow panel recommendations, however, a court
may find that the FDA acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The
FDA's final monograph must be supported by the administrative record, 135 and the court must consider panel recommendations because
judicial review is of the record as a whole. 136 The court must therefore
examine not only the justifications for the administrative action but also
evidence that undercuts the decision. 137
The 1938 Act makes the general recognition of a drug the crucial
inquiry in determining "new drug" status. It may be argued that a drug
cannot be GRAS&E when there is disagreement between the Commissioner and the panel. 138 General recognition does not have to be unanimous, however, because even properly conducted studies may produce
disagreement, 139 but the FDA will be obliged to support its position with
well-documented facts. 140 Pre-enforcementjudicial review will be a feasible course for plaintiffs whose position is supported by a comprehensive
panel report. 141

134

Bass, supra note 109, at 452; Harlow, supra note 99, at 257.
The grounds for agency action must clearly appear in the record, and the agency's
analysis and reasoning must be plainly apparent. Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023,
1029 (10th Cir. 1976).
136
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), § IO(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Judicial review
under the "arbitrary or capricious" test is not restricted to the record before the administrative body. Beckham v. United States, 375 F.2d 782, 785 (Ct. Cl. 1967). An agency in
preenforcement review cannot designate which items it considers to be in the administrative
record. Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1008 (D. Del. 1975).
137
DAvis,supra note 97, § 29.01. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
47 4, 487 (1951).
138
The House Committee on Government Operations found the FDA staff to be competent for resolving many of the issues put before the advisory panels, ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 50, at 5, in making its charge that the FDA is making nonessential use of
the panels. However, this charge ignores the enormousness of the regulatory task confronting the FDA. The staff is also not likely to be as knowledgeable as the panel members on the
particulars of any therapeutic category.
139
United States v. Articles of Food and Drug, Etc., 518 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1975);
United States v. 7 Cartons,• ••Ferro-Lac, 293 F. Supp. 660, 662 (S.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd 424
F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1970).
140
See note 21 supra concerning the types of evidence that must be shown under §§
505(d), (e) of the amended 1938 Act. The Court in Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973), held the same sort of inquiry applicable to the "new drug" issue;
simple as,sertions will not be sufficient to establish GRAS&E.
141
After the publication of the final monograph, several administrative alternatives are
available. A manufacturer or consumer can petition the Commissioner to amend the final
monograph. 21 C.F.R. § 330.IO(a) (12) (1977). See 42 Fed. Reg. 19,137 (1977). A manufacturer can also file an NDA with the FDA. In an attempt to reduce the time and resources
necessary for the approval of an NDA, an abbreviated procedure has been created whereby
an application must include a statement "that the product meets all the conditions of the
applicable monograph except for the deviation for which approval is requested and may omit
all information except that pertinent to the deviation." 21 C.F.R. § 330.11 (1977). Neither
procedure may be feasible if the FDA is adamant about the position taken in the final
monograph unless the manufacturer can present new information.
135
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CONCLUSION

The OTC drug review is an industrious effort by the FDA to improve its
marketing controls over OTC drugs. 142 The deficiencies of the traditional
NOA licensing approach, including the enormous amount of time and
resources necessary to process individual drug applications and the
grandfather clauses exempting most OTC drugs from the "new drug"
definition, required innovation by the FDA. By defining GRAS&E and
misbranding, the FDA provides all parties with more certainty concerning
the status of individual drugs under the Act. In addition, it also eliminates
the inequities caused when some drugs remain on the market indefinitely
while competitive drugs are subjected to FDA enforcement.
The advisory panels are essential to the review because of the prestige
that the panel members contribute to the review and because of their
effectiveness in evaluating data and formulating comprehensive reports.
The panel framework also allows maximum visibility and accessibility to
panel operations through the liaison members and by allowing interested
persons to attend and participate jn panel meetings.
The OTC drug review provides for expeditious enforcement because
the question whether particular drugs are GRAS&E and not misbranded
is determined administratively. The courts, to which the FDA must ultimately resort for enforcement, will likely accord the monographs legislative effect, which will limit judicial inquiry to whether a drug complies
with the applicable monograph. The role of the courts will be to determine
whether there is an adequate evidentiary basis to. support the FDA,
especially when the final monograph does not incorporate panel recommendations.
-David Selmer

142
The OTC drug review can serve as a model for other regulatory programs, and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has proposed to use the FDA's monographs in its
regulation of drug advertising. 41 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 14,~34 (1976). The
FTC rather than the FDA has jurisdiction over drug advertising. See Note, The FTC' s
Injunctive Alllhority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, 75 MICH. L. REV. 745,
758-759 (1977). The regulations would be promulgated as trade regulation rules (TRRs)
under § 202 of the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B) (1970).

